dc.contributor.author
Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria
dc.contributor.author
Rafels, Carles
dc.date.issued
2013-02-25T16:13:48Z
dc.date.issued
2013-02-25T16:13:48Z
dc.date.issued
2013-02-25T16:13:48Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/33969
dc.description.abstract
[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.
dc.description.abstract
[eng] A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets defined by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this aim, a set of payoff vectors, called max-payoff vectors, are introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E10241.rdf/view
dc.relation
Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2010, E10/241
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco10/241]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Izquierdo Aznar et al., 2010
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Funcions de variables complexes
dc.subject
Equacions diferencials no lineals
dc.subject
Camps vectorials
dc.subject
Anàlisi vectorial
dc.subject
Functions of complex variables
dc.subject
Nonlinear differential equations
dc.subject
Vector analysis
dc.title
On the coincidence between the Shimomura's bargaining sets and the core
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
