Wealth tax enforcement: The role of tax and institutional design

Publication date

2026-01-20T12:42:43Z

2026-01-20T12:42:43Z

2025



Abstract

Enforcing wealth tax compliance among high-net-worth individuals is particularly challenging. Using administrative data on the Net Wealth Tax for Catalan taxpayers over the 2011–2020 period, this paper evaluates the impact of audits on voluntary compliance. The evidence suggests that wealth tax audits do enhance compliance, but the impact is short-lived — and driven by taxpayers rebalancing their tax evasion and avoidance responses. On the institutional side, the results indicate that Spain’s overlapping tax audit mandates can create coordination frictions that reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of audit-based enforcement of the New Wealth Tax. Effective enforcement depends not only on robust audit strategies, but also on coherent institutional design and sound tax policy.

Document Type

Working document

Language

English

Publisher

Institut d’Economia de Barcelona

Related items

Reproducció del document publicat a: https://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Doc2025-15_ok.pdf

IEB Working Paper 2025/15

[WP E-IEB25/15]

Recommended citation

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Rights

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Durán Cabré et al., 2025

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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