dc.contributor.author
Oms Sardans, Sergi, 1974-
dc.date.issued
2026-01-16T14:55:27Z
dc.date.issued
2026-01-16T14:55:27Z
dc.date.issued
2026-01-16T14:55:27Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/225639
dc.description.abstract
Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibersitatea
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.635
dc.relation
Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2010, vol. 25, num.2, p. 137-147
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.635
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Sergi Oms, 2010
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject
Vaguetat (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Semàntica (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Vagueness (Philosophy)
dc.subject
Semantics (Philosophy)
dc.title
Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
