dc.contributor.author
Yin, Xiuxia
dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria
dc.date.issued
2025-12-09T10:37:48Z
dc.date.issued
2025-12-09T10:37:48Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224747
dc.description.abstract
In claims problems, we explore three characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule based on how allocations respond to an agent increasing its claim. In the first one we ensure that over-demanding by an unsatisfied agent does not harm others. In the second one we require that such over-demanding leaves the entire allocation unchanged. Finally, in the third one we weaken this last condition by protecting only the initially fully compensated agents.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2025 E25/490
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco25/490]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Yin et al., 2025
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject
Assignació de recursos
dc.subject
Anàlisi de variància
dc.subject
Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat)
dc.subject
Resource allocation
dc.subject
Analysis of variance
dc.subject
Distribution (Probability theory)
dc.title
What Happens When Some Agents Over-Demand in Claims Problems
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
