dc.contributor.author
Atay, Ata
dc.contributor.author
Funck, Sylvain
dc.contributor.author
Mauleon, Ana
dc.contributor.author
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned
2025-11-19T22:04:29Z
dc.date.available
2025-11-19T22:04:29Z
dc.date.issued
2025-09-02T11:30:47Z
dc.date.issued
2025-09-02T11:30:47Z
dc.date.issued
2025-05-01
dc.date.issued
2025-09-02T11:30:47Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/222898
dc.identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/222898
dc.description.abstract
We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted stable set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Springer Verlag
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01544-z
dc.relation
Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. 64, p. 465-481
dc.relation
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01544-z
dc.rights
(c) Springer Verlag, 2025
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject
Economia de mercat
dc.subject
Teoria de conjunts
dc.subject
Disseny industrial
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Market economy
dc.subject
Industrial design
dc.title
Matching markets with farsighted couples
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
