dc.contributor.author
Gregory, Daniel
dc.date.issued
2025-01-18T15:05:01Z
dc.date.issued
2025-01-18T15:05:01Z
dc.date.issued
2023-02-17
dc.date.issued
2025-01-18T15:05:01Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217646
dc.description.abstract
The problem of dream skepticism – i.e., the problem of what can justify one’s belief
that they are not dreaming – is one of the most famous problems in philosophy. I
propose a way of responding to the problem which is available if one subscribes to
the theory that the sensory experiences that we have in dreams consist of images
(as opposed to false percepts). The response exploits a particular feature of imagination, viz., that it is not possible to simultaneously have two separate imagistic experiences in the same modality.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Springer Verlag
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00662-x
dc.relation
Erkenntnis. An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy, 2023, vol. 89, p. 2967-2984
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00662-x
dc.rights
cc-by (c) Gregory, Daniel, 2023
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Imatge (Psicologia)
dc.subject
Imagery (Psychology)
dc.title
Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
