dc.contributor.author
Atay, Ata
dc.contributor.author
Mauleon, Ana
dc.contributor.author
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
dc.date.issued
2025-01-08T12:48:30Z
dc.date.issued
2025-01-01
dc.date.issued
2025-01-08T12:48:31Z
dc.date.issued
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2027-11-27
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217321
dc.description.abstract
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. How- ever, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already su cient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justi ed envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
dc.relation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, num.January, p. 148-163
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2025
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject
Elecció d'escola
dc.subject
Previsió social
dc.subject
Assignació de recursos
dc.subject
Anàlisi matemàtica
dc.subject
Social prediction
dc.subject
Resource allocation
dc.subject
Mathematical analysis
dc.title
School choice with farsighted students
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
