The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors

dc.contributor.author
Chiappinelli, Olga
dc.contributor.author
Dalò, Ambrogio
dc.contributor.author
Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
dc.date.issued
2024-09-27T18:43:08Z
dc.date.issued
2024-09-27T18:43:08Z
dc.date.issued
2024
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/215447
dc.description.abstract
Governments can support the green transition through green public procurement. Despite its strategic importance, the impact of this policy on firms remains unclear. Using US data, this paper provides the first empirical analysis of the causal effects of green contracts on corporate environmental and economic performance. We focus on an affirmative program for sustainable products, which represents one-sixth of the total federal procurement budget, and publicly traded firms, which account for one-third of total US emissions. Our results show that securing green contracts reduces emissions relative to firm size and increases productivity, with these effects persisting in the long run. We find no evidence that the program selects greener firms, nor that green public procurement sales crowd out private sales. We propose that increased R&D investment, incentivized by the program’s requirements, is a key mechanism behind these improvements.
dc.format
50 p.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language
eng
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2024, E24/474
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco24/474]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Chiappinelli et al., 2024
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Contractes administratius
dc.subject
Política ambiental
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Gestió de la rendibilitat
dc.subject
Public contracts
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Environmental policy
dc.subject
Revenue management
dc.title
The greener, the better? Evidence from government contractors
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper


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