dc.contributor.author
Oms Sardans, Sergi
dc.date.issued
2024-06-28T18:15:34Z
dc.date.issued
2024-06-28T18:15:34Z
dc.date.issued
2024-06-28T18:15:40Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/213983
dc.description.abstract
[eng] This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Springer Nature
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2
dc.relation
Acta Analytica, 2023, vol. 38, p. 211-228
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2
dc.rights
cc by (c) Oms, Sergi, 2022
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Veritat i mentida
dc.subject
Epistemologia genètica
dc.subject
Filosofia de la ment
dc.subject
Truthfulness and falsehood
dc.subject
Genetic epistemology
dc.subject
Philosophy of mind
dc.title
Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
