Universitat de Barcelona
2024-02-02T12:23:23Z
2024-02-02T12:23:23Z
2024-03-01
2024-02-02T12:23:23Z
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.
Article
Accepted version
English
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica); Estadística matemàtica; Geometria algebraica; Teoria d'operadors; Cooperative games (Mathematics); Mathematical statistics; Algebraic geometry; Operator theory
Elsevier B.V.
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, num.March, p. 10-15
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003
cc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
