dc.contributor.author
Palmira, Michele
dc.date.issued
2023-06-12T15:37:37Z
dc.date.issued
2023-06-12T15:37:37Z
dc.date.issued
2020-01-09
dc.date.issued
2023-06-12T15:37:37Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199083
dc.description.abstract
This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one's judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
University of Calgary Press
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.46
dc.relation
Canadian journal of philosophy, 2020, vol. 50, num. 4, p. 524-538
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.46
dc.rights
(c) University of Calgary Press, 2020
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Teoria del coneixement
dc.subject
Theory of knowledge
dc.title
Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
