dc.contributor.author
Atay, Ata
dc.contributor.author
Funck, Sylvain
dc.contributor.author
Mauleon, Ana
dc.contributor.author
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
dc.date.issued
2023-05-10T23:18:52Z
dc.date.issued
2023-05-10T23:18:52Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/197820
dc.description.abstract
We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which match-ings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted sta-ble set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2023, E23/445
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco23/445]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay et al., 2023
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Ensenyament de la medicina
dc.subject
Residents (Medicina)
dc.subject
Mercat de treball
dc.subject
Medicine education
dc.subject
Residents (Medicine)
dc.title
Matching markets with farsighted couples [WP]
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
