Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.contributor.author
Rafels, Carles
dc.date.issued
2011-09-05T12:20:07Z
dc.date.issued
2011-09-05T12:20:07Z
dc.date.issued
2010
dc.identifier
1136-8365
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/19402
dc.description.abstract
We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.
dc.format
15 p.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E10245.rdf/view
dc.relation
Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2010, E10/245
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco10/245]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Llerena, et al., 2010
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Econometria
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Econometrics
dc.subject
Game theory
dc.title
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper


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