dc.contributor.author
Marques, Teresa
dc.date.issued
2021-12-21T15:27:53Z
dc.date.issued
2021-12-21T15:27:53Z
dc.date.issued
2021-07-26
dc.date.issued
2021-12-21T15:27:53Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/181958
dc.description.abstract
Disagreements about what we owe to each other and about how to live pervade different dimensions of human interaction. We communicate our different moral and normative views in discourse. These dis- putes have features that are challenging to some seman- tic theories. This paper assesses recent Stalnakerian views of communication in moral and normative do- mains. These views model conversational context up- dates made with normative claims. They also aim to explain disputes between people who follow different norms or values. The paper presents various problems for these Stalnakerian views. Together, the problems show the insufficiency of metasemantic theories based only on speakers' psychological states in general, and of their application to normative communication in particular. The paper concludes that the problems re- quire a new conception of how common ground relates to illocutionary force and attitude mode.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12488
dc.relation
METAPHILOSOPHY, 2021, vol. 52, num. 3-4, p. 449-465
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12488
dc.rights
cc by-nc-nd (c) Marques, Teresa, 2021
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Conflicte (Psicologia)
dc.subject
Normativity (Ethics)
dc.subject
Conflict (Psychology)
dc.title
Illocutionary force and attitude mode in normative disputes
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
