dc.contributor.author
Hoefer, Carl
dc.contributor.author
Viger, Christopher
dc.contributor.author
Viger, Daniel
dc.date.issued
2020-06-19T14:18:26Z
dc.date.issued
2020-06-19T14:18:26Z
dc.date.issued
2019-12-01
dc.date.issued
2020-06-19T14:18:26Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/166337
dc.description.abstract
We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibersitatea
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20040
dc.relation
Theoria, 2019, vol. 34, num. 3, p. 407-421
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20040
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Hoefer, Carl et al., 2019
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Presa de decisions
dc.subject
Elecció (Psicologia)
dc.subject
Decision making
dc.subject
Choice (Psychology)
dc.subject
Newcomb, William A.
dc.title
The philosopher's paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
