Para acceder a los documentos con el texto completo, por favor, siga el siguiente enlace: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/165604

Reference without Cognition
Martí, Genoveva
This chapter criticizes the view, recently defended by David Kaplan and others, that uses of proper names semantically refer to their bearers in virtue of speakers’ having the referents in mind. It is argued that grounding semantic reference in cognition is contrary to the tenets that Kaplan himself contributed to establish in the revolution against descriptivism and internalism in semantics. It is argued also that the having in mind of an object is neither necessary nor sufficient for a use of a name to refer to its bearer. The criticisms lead to a reflection on the institution of naming and to a positive proposal: an externalist view, on which referring with uses of names requires that speakers join systematic, not necessarily social, linguistic practices.
-Filosofia del llenguatge
-Noms propis
-Philosophy of language
-Proper names
(c) Oxford University Press, 2015
Capítulo o parte de libro
Artículo - Versión aceptada
Oxford University Press
         

Mostrar el registro completo del ítem

Documentos relacionados

Otros documentos del mismo autor/a

Martí, Genoveva; Martínez Fernández, José
Martí, Genoveva; Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena