dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.date.issued
2020-05-13T06:57:39Z
dc.date.issued
2023-05-31T05:10:16Z
dc.date.issued
2020-05-13T06:57:39Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/159858
dc.description.abstract
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property. Remarkably, impossibility results emerge when replacing self consistency by a large set of consistency properties.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Elsevier B.V.
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.04.001
dc.relation
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 105, num. May, p. 28-33
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.04.001
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2020
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject
Equitat (Dret)
dc.subject
Eficàcia organitzativa
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Teoria de l'estimació
dc.subject
Organizational effectiveness
dc.subject
Estimation theory
dc.title
Consistency, weak fairness and the Shapley value
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
