dc.contributor.author
Palmira, Michele
dc.date.issued
2020-03-30T11:18:47Z
dc.date.issued
2020-03-30T11:18:47Z
dc.date.issued
2020-03-30T11:18:47Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154368
dc.description.abstract
Thomas Kelly has argued that the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement is committed both to belief revision and to the Uniqueness Thesis, which claims that for any hypothesis H and a total body of evidence e, there is some one-doxastic attitude that is uniquely rational to adopt towards H. I rebut both theses and I also defend the view that in Kelly's case the Uniqueness Thesis doesn't require belief revision.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
University of Kent
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://research.kent.ac.uk/reasoning/wp-content/uploads/sites/581/2019/06/TheReasoner-71-screen.pdf
dc.relation
The Reasoner, 2013, vol. 7, num. 1, p. 4-5
dc.rights
(c) Palmira, Michele, 2013
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Teoria del coneixement
dc.subject
Creença i dubte
dc.subject
Theory of knowledge
dc.subject
Belief and doubt
dc.title
Belief Revision, Uniqueness and the Equal Weight View
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
