Universitat de Barcelona
2020-02-19T11:29:57Z
2022-03-31T05:10:20Z
2019-03
2020-02-19T11:29:58Z
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.
Article
Accepted version
English
Assignació de recursos; Competència econòmica; Presa de decisions (Estadística); Matemàtica financera; Resource allocation; Competition; Statistical decision; Business mathematics
Elsevier B.V.
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, num. March, p. 10-14
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.12.002
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
