dc.contributor.author
Alonso-Meijide, José Mª
dc.contributor.author
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
dc.contributor.author
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962-
dc.contributor.author
Jiménez-Losada, Andrés
dc.date.issued
2020-01-14T13:42:50Z
dc.date.issued
2020-01-14T13:42:50Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147779
dc.description.abstract
We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2019, E19/398
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco19/398]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Alonso-Meijide et al., 2019
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Externalitats (Economia)
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Optimització matemàtica
dc.subject
Funcions convexes
dc.subject
Externalities (Economics)
dc.subject
Mathematical optimization
dc.subject
Convex functions
dc.title
On Convexity in Games with Externalities
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
