dc.contributor.author
Palmira, Michele
dc.date.issued
2019-12-04T08:06:15Z
dc.date.issued
2020-12-31T06:10:18Z
dc.date.issued
2019-12-04T08:06:15Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146037
dc.description.abstract
While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
University of Illinois Press
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: http://apq.press.uillinois.edu/56/1/palmira.html
dc.relation
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2019, vol. 56, num. 1, p. 83-96
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415/EU//DIAPHORA
dc.rights
(c) Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2019
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Teoria del coneixement
dc.subject
Theory of knowledge
dc.title
How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
