dc.contributor.author
Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
dc.contributor.author
Rafels, Carles
dc.contributor.author
Ybern, Neus
dc.date.issued
2019-11-08T11:20:02Z
dc.date.issued
2019-11-08T11:20:02Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/144180
dc.description.abstract
We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2019, E19/395
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco19/395]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Martínez de Albéniz al., 2019
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Matemàtica financera
dc.subject
Models matemàtics
dc.subject
Assignació de recursos
dc.subject
Business mathematics
dc.subject
Mathematical models
dc.subject
Resource allocation
dc.title
Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points [WP]
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
