dc.contributor.author
Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
dc.contributor.author
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
dc.date.issued
2018-10-05T09:24:37Z
dc.date.issued
2018-10-05T09:24:37Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125086
dc.description.abstract
Several countries have experienced lengthy periods of political deadlock in recent years, as they have sought to form a new government. This study examines whether government formation deadlocks damagea country’s economy. To do so, we analyze the case of Belgium, which took a record 541 days to create a post-election government, following the June 2010 federal elections. Employing the synthetic control method, our results show that the Belgian economy did not suffer an economic toll; on the contrary, GDP per capita growth was higher than would have otherwise been expected. As such, our evidence contradicts frequent claims that long periods of government formation deadlock negatively affect an economy.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2018/201817.pdf
dc.relation
IREA – Working Papers, 2018, IR18/17
dc.relation
[WP E-IR18/17]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Albalate et al., 2018
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))
dc.subject
Govern parlamentari
dc.subject
Teoria econòmica
dc.subject
Cabinet system
dc.subject
Economic theory
dc.subject
Practical politics
dc.title
Do government formation deadlocks damage economic growth? Evidence from history's longest period of political deadlock [WP]
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper