The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

Abstract

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and superadditive games

Aquest article proporciona un marc axiomàtic per a comparar el Cor de d (el joc d'imputacions indominades) i el cor d'un joc cooperatiu amb la utilitat trasferible. El teorema 1 estats que el Cor de d és l'única solució que satisfà la consistència de projecció, el raonable (des de dalt), (*)-*antimonotonicity, i la *modularitat. El teorema 2 caracteritza el substituir de cor (*)-*antimonotonicity per *antimonotonicity. A més, aquests axiomes també caracteritzen el cor sobre el domini de jocs convexs, jocs totalment equilibrats, jocs equilibrats, i jocs superadditius.