Why TTIP is an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer, but not a Polanyian moment

Abstract

This paper looks at the TTIP from a trade policy perspective. It argues that while TTIP is an unprecedented bilateral agreement, it does not constitute a Polanyian moment. TTIP is unprecedented in both EU and international trade policy terms because it offers an alternative to WTO multilateralism. Never before has bilateralism offered such a 'best alternative to no agreement' (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, however, has not been driven either by geopolitical or trade liberalization concerns but by fears about EU bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents to TTIP reflect concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the same. The US is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to impose its preferences which are considered too neo-liberal.