dc.contributor.author
Tejada, Oriol
dc.contributor.author
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
dc.date.issued
2017-07-19T11:41:42Z
dc.date.issued
2017-07-19T11:41:42Z
dc.date.issued
2017-07-19T11:41:42Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/114072
dc.description.abstract
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new vàlues extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value respectively. Our results enable the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic insights for the analysis of fair resource allocation in nowadays fully integrated societies.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2017, E17/363
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco17/363]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Tejada et al., 2017
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject
Graphic methods
dc.subject
Resource allocation
dc.subject
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject
Mètodes gràfics
dc.subject
Assignació de recursos
dc.title
Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
