Para acceder a los documentos con el texto completo, por favor, siga el siguiente enlace: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/112646
Título:
|
Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy
|
Autor/a:
|
Galletta, Sergio
|
Notas:
|
In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities. |
Materia(s):
|
-Màfia -Corrupció -Itàlia -Mafia -Corruption -Italy |
Derechos:
|
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Galletta et al., 2016
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
|
Tipo de documento:
|
Documento de trabajo |
Editor:
|
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
|
Compartir:
|
|
Mostrar el registro completo del ítem