Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorísmia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
2026-03-14
This paper considers resolute decision rules in which each voter may vote “yes", “abstain" or vote “no", and the outcome is “yes" or “no". The model we consider is more general than that of simple games since the input admits abstention or indecision, but it is more specialized since it assumes the properties of monotonicity and anonymity. Many subclasses of these resolute decision rules have been studied in the literature from an axiomatic point of view. The purpose of this work is to enumerate these subclasses as a function of the number of voters.
This research was partially supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación [PID-2020-112581GB-C21, MOTION] and the Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (AGAUR) of the Government of Catalonia under project 2017 SGR 786 (ALBCOM). We greatly appreciate the comments of two anonymous referees who have contributed to improve the presentation of this work.
Peer Reviewed
Postprint (published version)
Article
English
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs; Resolute rules; Majority rules; Dedekind numbers; Classification of subclasses of resolute rules; Enumerations of subclasses of resolute rules
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10878-026-01412-9
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-112581GB-C21/ES/MODELOS Y TECNICAS PARA EL PROCESAMIENTO DE INFORMACION A GRAN ESCALA -- BARCELONA/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Open Access
Attribution 4.0 International
E-prints [72872]
