dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor.author |
Dahm, Matthias |
dc.contributor.author |
González, Paula |
dc.contributor.author |
Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás |
dc.date.accessioned |
2008-04-24T15:11:22Z |
dc.date.available |
2008-04-24T15:11:22Z |
dc.date.created |
2008 |
dc.date.issued |
2008 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1988 - 0812 |
dc.identifier.other |
T – 811- 2008 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/5360 |
dc.format.extent |
33 |
dc.format.extent |
461779 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2008-01 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Indústria farmacèutica |
dc.subject.other |
Comunicació científica |
dc.subject.other |
Assaigs clínics |
dc.subject.other |
Coneixement científic |
dc.title |
Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió, control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus |
dc.description.abstract |
Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework
which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary
clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as
well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence
effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials.
Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry
is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies'
decisions whether to conduct trials.
Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge
JEL classification: D72, I18, L15 |