dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor.author |
Dahm, Matthias |
dc.contributor.author |
Dur, Robert |
dc.contributor.author |
Glazerz, Amihai |
dc.date.accessioned |
2010-02-23T18:33:06Z |
dc.date.available |
2010-02-23T18:33:06Z |
dc.date.created |
2009 |
dc.date.issued |
2009 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1988 - 0812 |
dc.identifier.other |
T - 2121 - 2009 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/43869 |
dc.format.extent |
29 |
dc.format.extent |
400603 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-22 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Vot -- Investigació |
dc.subject.other |
Política pública |
dc.subject.other |
Grups de pressió |
dc.subject.other |
Política -- Aspectes socials |
dc.subject.other |
Empreses -- Aspectes polítics |
dc.title |
Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
32 - Política |
dc.description.abstract |
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible. |