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The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution
Konstantinidis, Nikitas
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals
I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.
01 - Bibliografia. Catàlegs
Economia -- Aspectes polítics
Renda -- Distribució
Recursos naturals
Economia -- Creixement
Creixement econòmic
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32 p.
Working Paper
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals
IBEI Working Papers;2009/19

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