An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

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dc.contributor	Universitat de Barcelona
dc.contributor.author	Atay, Ata
dc.date	2016-09-22T06:56:32Z
dc.date	2016-09-22T06:56:32Z
dc.date	2016
dc.date	2016-09-22T06:56:37Z
dc.identifier.citation	1136-8365
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040
dc.format	9 p.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation	UB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/350
dc.relation	[WP E-Eco16/350]
dc.rights	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay , 2016
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subject	Teoria de jocs
dc.subject	Assignació de recursos
dc.subject	Àlgebres de Von Neumann
dc.subject	Problema de Neumann
dc.subject	Game theory
dc.subject	Resource allocation
dc.subject	Von Neumann algebras
dc.subject	Neumann problema
dc.title	An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.description.abstract	Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)