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Título:
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Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
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Autor/a:
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Freixas Bosch, Josep; Tchantcho, Bertrand; Tedjeugang, Narcisse
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
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Abstract:
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It is well known that he influence relation orders the voters the same way as the classical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices do when they are extended to the voting games with abstention (VGA) in the class of complete games. Moreover, all hierarchies for the influence relation are achievable in the class of complete VGA. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that all hierarchies are achievable in a subclass of weighted VGA, the class of weighted games for which a single weight is assigned to voters. Secondly, we conduct a partial study of achievable hierarchies within the subclass of H-complete games, that is, complete games under stronger versions of influence relation. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
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Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
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Materia(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
-Decision making -- Mathematical models
-Voting -- Mathematical models
-Voting -- Abstention
-Hierarchies
-Game theory
-Voting rules
-Abstention
-Decision support systems
-Weightedness and completeness
-Hierarchies
-Ordinal equivalence
-Power
-Approval
-Systems
-Banzhaf
-Output
-Input
-Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
-Vot -- Models matemàtics
-Abstencionisme electoral
-Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
-Classificació AMS::05 Combinatorics::05C Graph theory
-Classificació AMS::94 Information And Communication, Circuits::94C Circuits, networks |
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Derechos:
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Tipo de documento:
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Artículo - Versión presentada
Artículo |
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Editor:
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Elsevier
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Compartir:
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