dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel |
dc.contributor.author |
Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel |
dc.contributor.author |
Peris, Josep E. |
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-06-13T07:46:44Z |
dc.date.available |
2013-06-13T07:46:44Z |
dc.date.created |
2013-05-22 |
dc.date.issued |
2013 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212193 |
dc.format.extent |
20 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-14 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs cooperatius |
dc.subject.other |
Igualtat |
dc.subject.other |
Decisió, Presa de |
dc.title |
From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To
answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions
and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally
transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions
set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already
developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions
over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment.
A comparison among our results and theirs is provided.
Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional,
Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining
solution.
JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71. |