From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Other authors

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública

Publication date

2013



Abstract

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Document Type

Working document

Language

English

Pages

20 p.

Publisher

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Collection

Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia; 2013-14

Recommended citation

This citation was generated automatically.

Documents

201314.pdf

711.5Kb

 

Rights

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

This item appears in the following Collection(s)