A proportional extension of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure

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To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6872

dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II
dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.author	Alonso Meijide, José María
dc.contributor.author	Carreras Escobar, Francisco
dc.date	2009-03-06
dc.identifier.citation	Alonso, J.; Carreras, F. "A proportional extension of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure". 2009.
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2117/6872
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject	Game theory
dc.subject	Cooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject	Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.title	A proportional extension of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/report
dc.description.abstract	The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this paper, we propose another modification of the Shapley value for monotone games with a coalition structure. This new value is a double- extension of the Shapley value in the next sense: the amount obtained by an union coincides with the Shapley value of the union in the quotient game, and the players of each union share this amount proportionally to their Shapley values in the game without unions. We give two characterizations of this new value. The axiomatic systems used here can be compared with parallel axiomatizations of the Owen value.

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