Universitat de Girona
Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia
2003-05
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership in the society by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now find undersirable to belong to the society as well. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative, but also on the final composition of the society
Documento de trabajo
Inglés
Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1579-475X
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