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Noise and aggregation of information in large markets
García, Diego; Urosevic, Branko
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.
Finance and Accounting
partially revealing equilibria
competitive equilibrium
rational expectations
information acquisition
markets for information
derivatives trading
multi-asset markets
share auctions
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