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Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders
Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntaryinitiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressuregroups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs.Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporategovernance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. Weshow that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in thefirm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful socialactivists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value.These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known socialactivists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders likeCalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.
Finance and Accounting
corporate governance
managerial entrenchment
social activists
small shareholders
stakeholder society
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