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Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation
Aragonés, Enriqueta; Postlewaite, Andrew
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaignrhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over whatpolicy the candidate will implement in case he wins theelection. We develop a model of repeated elections withcomplete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaignpromises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises arebelieved by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtainthat the degree to which promises are credible in equilibriumis an increasing function of the value of a candidate'sreputation.
15-09-2005
Microeconomics
electoral campaigns
reputation
commitment
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