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Endogenous information structures
Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations withprivately informed agents. In those models the information structure isassumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether suchmodels, and the results they produce, are robust with respect theendogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whetherinformation acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategicsituation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we findthat only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous,the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly butmoves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, privateinformation acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.
2005-09-15
Microeconomics
information acquisition
private information
equilibrium
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Working Paper
         

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