dc.contributor.author |
Aragonès, Enriqueta |
dc.contributor.author |
Xefteris, Dimitrios |
dc.contributor.author |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica |
dc.contributor.author |
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
dc.date |
2011 |
dc.identifier |
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/71434 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:71434 |
dc.format |
application/pdf |
dc.language |
eng |
dc.publisher |
|
dc.relation |
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ; |
dc.rights |
open access |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús |
dc.rights |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ |
dc.subject |
Nash, Varietats de |
dc.subject |
Eleccions Models matemàtics |
dc.title |
Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a continuous policy space |
dc.type |
Working paper |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We assume that voters have quadratic preferences over policies and that their ideal points are drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. In our equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. We show that this equilibrium exists if the number of voters is large enough relative to the size of the advantage. |