Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

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dc.contributor.author	Alonso Carrera, Jaime
dc.contributor.author	Caballé, Jordi
dc.contributor.author	Raurich, Xavier
dc.contributor.author	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.contributor.author	Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.date	2006
dc.identifier	https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45198
dc.identifier	urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:45198
dc.identifier	urn:10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00357.x
dc.identifier	urn:recercauab:ARE-28633
dc.identifier	urn:scopus_id:4444338620
dc.identifier	urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/f3614bd8-6c1e-4da6-a5b9-cf64f4034684
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ;
dc.rights	open access
dc.rights	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús
dc.rights	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
dc.subject	Finances Models economètrics
dc.title	Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency
dc.type	Working paper
dc.description.abstract	We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

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