dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Fiocco, Raffaele |
dc.date.accessioned |
2016-10-20T15:02:34Z |
dc.date.available |
2016-10-20T15:02:34Z |
dc.date.created |
2016 |
dc.date.issued |
2016 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/267267 |
dc.format.extent |
36 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-28 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Informació -- Aspectes econòmics |
dc.subject.other |
Competència econòmica |
dc.title |
The strategic value of partial vertical integration |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial
ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know
their costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. The partial misalignment
between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer-retailer hierarchy
entails a higher retail price than under full integration. This `information vertical effect'
translates into an opposite `competition horizontal effect': the partially integrated hierarchy's
commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price, which
strategically relaxes competition. Our analysis provides implications for vertical merger
policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial
vertical acquisitions.
Keywords: asymmetric information, partial vertical integration, vertical mergers, vertical
restraints.
JEL Classification: D82, L13, L42. |