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An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Navarro, Montserrat
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Projectes Arquitectònics; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
Let us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the probability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and that to achieve this goal he/she is prepared to pay off one member of the committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is allowed and free of stigma, which voter should be offered a bribe? The potential decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the effect that ensuring one positive vote produces for the probability of passing the issue at hand, is a good tool with which to acquire the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is shown.
Peer Reviewed
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
Game theory
Decision making--Mathematical models
Voting--Mathematical models
Game theory
Potential decisiveness index
Measure for bribes
Standard power indices
Relationship among several measures
Ordinal equivalence
Voting games
Jocs, Teoria de
Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
Vot -- Models matemàtics
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory

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