dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Osório, António (António Miguel) |
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-04-22T15:53:22Z |
dc.date.available |
2015-04-22T15:53:22Z |
dc.date.created |
2015-03-23 |
dc.date.issued |
2015 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/249233 |
dc.format.extent |
13 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-14 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Teoria de jocs |
dc.subject.other |
Informació, Teoria de la |
dc.subject.other |
Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics |
dc.title |
Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish
incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former,
for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of
information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the
signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a
"non-selective" use.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor-
mation Characteristics. |