dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel |
dc.date.accessioned |
2012-02-08T14:37:27Z |
dc.date.available |
2012-02-08T14:37:27Z |
dc.date.created |
2011-12-18 |
dc.date.issued |
2011 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/179668 |
dc.format.extent |
28 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-31 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Teoria de jocs |
dc.title |
Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.subject.udc |
65 - Gestió i organització. Administració i direcció d'empreses. Publicitat. Relacions públiques. Mitjans de comunicació de masses |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known
or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows
that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the
monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way.
Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are
patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of
incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution
of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the
direction and strength of these effects.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes. |