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Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition
Cuñat, Vicente; Guadalupe, Maria
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.
Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
wage structure
demand for talent
product market competition
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