Título:
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When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?
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Autor/a:
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Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat; Manzano, Carolina
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
Resum:
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Central banks often intervene secretly in the foreign exchange market. This secrecy
seems to be at odds with the signalling channel. In this article we will analyse when
a central bank intervening in the foreign exchange rate market purely through the
signalling channel would prefer to act secretly or publicly. By using a microstructure model, we will show that the consistency of the intervention with fundamentals, the volume of noise trading, the weight given to the effectiveness of intervention and the degree of superior information held by the central bank will influence the decision to intervene secretly or publicly. Keywords: foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classifi cation: D82, E58, F31, G14. |
Fecha de creación:
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2007 |
Materias (CDU):
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339 - Comerç. Relacions econòmiques internacionals. Economia mundial. Màrqueting |
Materia(s):
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Canvi exterior Mercat exterior Bancs centrals |
Derechos:
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Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
ISSN:
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1988 - 0812
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2007-07
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Compartir:
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