dc.contributor.author |
Pita Barros, Pedro |
dc.contributor.author |
Martínez Giralt, Xavier |
dc.date |
2009 |
dc.identifier |
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/174268 |
dc.identifier |
urn:10.1007/s10198-009-0152-7 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:174268 |
dc.identifier |
urn:articleid:16187598v10n4p437 |
dc.identifier |
urn:recercauab:ARE-55708 |
dc.identifier |
urn:scopus_id:69249226169 |
dc.identifier |
urn:wos_id:000269210200009 |
dc.identifier |
urn:altmetric_id:2112160 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/ac90d513-621a-45f9-94d9-d001641b842c |
dc.format |
application/pdf |
dc.language |
eng |
dc.publisher |
|
dc.relation |
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEJ2006-00538-ECON |
dc.relation |
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2005/SGR-00836 |
dc.relation |
The European journal of health economics ; Vol. 10 Núm. 4 (October 2009), p. 437-453 |
dc.rights |
open access |
dc.rights |
Tots els drets reservats. |
dc.rights |
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
dc.subject |
Public-private partnerships |
dc.subject |
Contract design |
dc.title |
Contractual design and PPPs for hospitals : lessons for the Portuguese model |
dc.type |
Article |
dc.description.abstract |
We acknowledge insightful comments by two anonymous referees. Financial support of POCTI/EGE/58934/2004 (Pedro P. Barros) and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and projects 2005SGR-00836, SEJ2006-00538-ECON, and Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (Xavier Martinez-Giralt) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. |
dc.description.abstract |
Altres ajuts: POCTI/EGE/58934/2004 |
dc.description.abstract |
Recently the Portuguese Government announced the launching of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to build hospitals with the distinctive feature that infrastructure construction and clinical activities management will be awarded to separate private parties. Also, one of the parties will be in charge of providing soft facilities. We explore alternative configurations of contracts and assess whether the equilibrium allocations attain the first-best solution. |